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Our topic this morning is negotiating
acquisitions of publicly traded companies. We
have on the panel Gar Bason of Davis Polk &
Wardwell here in New York, and Joel
Greenberg of Kaye Scholer, also here in New
York. They are going to be our lead
negotiators today. We also have Lisa Schmidt,
a director at the Delaware law firm of
Richards, Layton & Finger. My name is Rick
Climan. I am a partner in the Mergers &
Acquisitions Group at Weil, Gotshal & Manges
in Silicon Valley, and I will be chairing and
moderating this session.
Last year on this panel we addressed a number
of different facets of public company
acquisitions. We discussed the way we
structure these deals; we discussed the
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negotiation of standstill provisions; we
discussed the negotiation of exclusivity
agreements; and we discussed the negotiation
of the definitive acquisition agreement. In our
discussions relating to the definitive acquisition
agreement, we focused in particular on
acquisitions structured as friendly tender offers
and, in that context, we examined the
"mechanical" provisions of that agreement, as
well as the deal protection provisions and the
conditions to the buyer's obligation to purchase
the shares tendered in response to its tender
offer. We also talked about strategies for
addressing antitrust issues.
Thanks to the Penn State Law Review, we have
an edited transcript of last year's presentation,6
and we've included it in the materials for this
session. You should turn to that edited
transcript now, because we're going to be
referring to it frequently today.
Instead of covering the same ground we
covered last year, we're going to use the edited
transcript as a point of departure-a jumping
off point. This morning we're going to cover a
number of topics that we did not have the
opportunity to discuss last year, including some
topics that have become particularly relevant as
a result of regulatory and judicial
developments over the past year. We will
continue to focus on "two-step" acquisitions
involving friendly tender offers,7 although
much of our discussion today will also apply to
acquisitions structured as one-step mergers.
For a good chunk of our session today, we will
revert to the format of a mock negotiation, with
6. Richard E. Climan, George R. Bason, Frederick R. Green & Joel I. Greenberg,
Negotiating Acquisitions of Public Companies in Transactions Structured as Friendly
Tender Offers, 116 PENN ST. L. REv. 615 (2012) [hereinafter Friendly Tender Offers].
7. See id. at 620-36.
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Gar Bason playing the role of the target
company's outside lawyer and Joel Greenberg
playing the role of the buyer's outside lawyer.
Lisa Schmidt will chime in with her




We're going to begin this morning with one of
the preliminary documents that gets negotiated
early in the process of acquiring a public
company-the confidentiality agreement. Last
year we examined one very important
provision in the confidentiality agreement, the
so-called "standstill" provision. This is the
provision that limits the prospective buyer's
ability to go hostile on the target company for a
stipulated period of time. We're not going to
renegotiate that provision now; you can take a
look at the edited transcript of last year's
session for an illustration of how that
negotiation might proceed.8 Instead, we're
going to assume today that the parties have
already negotiated and come to agreement on
the terms of the standstill; and we're going to
assume in particular that they've agreed to a
15-month standstill period. So, for a period of
15 months, the prospective buyer has agreed
not to commence a hostile tender offer for the
acquisition of any target company shares and
not to take any other similarly hostile or
coercive action vis-A-vis the target company.
With the standstill provision already fully
negotiated, we're going to look at some other
key provisions of the confidentiality
agreement. These are provisions that have
8. See id. at 636-50.
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been thrust into the spotlight by a couple of
recent Delaware decisions, Vulcan9 and RAA, 10
both of which have had a noticeable effect on
the way confidentiality agreements are being
negotiated today.
You should have in front of you [Exhibit 1],11
which contains some excerpts from the target
company's form of confidentiality agreement,
as drafted by the target company's lawyer, Gar
Bason. Behind that you will find [Exhibit 2],12
which contains some excerpts from the
prospective buyer's response to that
confidentiality agreement, drafted by the
prospective buyer's lawyer, Joel Greenberg.
Let's take a look at section 1 of the target
company's form of confidentiality agreement,
which is really the guts of the agreement. It
contains two basic prohibitions-the "two
commandments," as we sometimes refer to
them-directed at the prospective buyer. The
first commandment is enshrined in section
l(a): thou shalt not use the target company's
confidential information, except for the
specific purpose indicated. The second
commandment is enshrined in section l(b) of
the confidentiality agreement: thou shalt not
disclose the target company's confidential
information, except as specifically permitted in
section 4 of the confidentiality agreement.
A. Use Restriction
RICK CLIMAN: We're going to focus initially on the first
(Moderator) commandment, the use restriction. Joel, let's
look at [Exhibit 2], which lays out your
9. Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 56 A.3d 1072 (Del. Ch.
2012), aff'd, 2012 WL 2783101 (Del. July 10, 2012).
10. RAA Mgmt., L.L.C. v. Savage Sports Holdings, Inc., 45 A.3d 107 (Del. 2012).
11. See infra pp. 700-03 (Exhibit 1).
12. See infra pp. 704-06 (Exhibit 2).
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requested changes to the target company's
original form of confidentiality agreement. It
appears you didn't particularly like the way
Gar drafted the permitted use language in the
use restriction.
Gar's permitted use language allows your
client, the prospective buyer, to use
confidential information "for the specific
purpose of considering, evaluating and
negotiating a possible negotiated transaction
between the parties." You replaced it with
something a lot broader. You replaced it with
language specifying that your client can use
confidential information "for the purpose of
considering, pursuing and/or facilitating a
possible transaction involving the Target
Company or any of its stockholders, including
an unsolicited or uninvited acquisition of the
Target Company or any of its securities." I
note that, among other things, you shortened
the term "possible negotiated transaction" to
"possible transaction"-you removed the term
"negotiated"-and you replaced the word
"between" with the more general word
"involving." What's going on here?
Well, I have to give Gar credit for being, in the
words of former Chancellor Chandler, a
"forthright negotiator." Gar's original
language is very clear as to what he's getting
at, which is to limit our use of confidential
information to a negotiated transaction
between the parties. That may sound
reasonable, but remember we've just
negotiated a 15-month standstill, and the use
restriction is for a longer period. As far as I'm
concerned, the standstill period is the agreed
deal as to when my client is precluded from
going hostile on the target company. I don't
want language anywhere else in the
confidentiality agreement that basically says,
[Vol. 117:3





"now that we have all this confidential
information, we can't use it in connection with
a proxy contest, a hostile tender offer or any
other approach we might need or decide to take
after the 15-month standstill period is over."
For 15 months we are barred from going
hostile, and that's the deal. Afterwards, we
should be free to do whatever we choose to do.
Look, I respect that view, but it seems
anomalous to me. As a business matter, my
client, the target company, thinks that while its
confidential information can be used for a
friendly deal, it shouldn't be used for a hostile
deal. We understand that at the end of 15
months you'll have the ability to do anything
you like. We just don't think that you should
use our confidential information to do that.
This isn't just an emotional thing. The fact is
that your client's use of my client's
confidential information gives your client an
edge over anyone else in the market. It's an
advantage that we don't think is appropriate or
fair.
Two points. Remember, this edge over anyone
else is going to be based on information that is,
by definition, at least 15 months old. It's not
as if my client will have current confidential
information. But more important, there is a
total lack of certainty on my client's part as to
whether we can do a transaction without your
client alleging that we are "using confidential
information."
Our senior management team is not
schizophrenic. They can't divide their brains
into two parts and say this part has the
confidential information and it's this other part
that's deciding to go hostile. And remember
the way we've defined "confidential
information." It includes derivatives of the
2013]







stuff you give my client. It's not just the piece
of paper that has a budget, for example; it's
also the analysis my client makes from that
budget. If your client decides to litigate, it's
going to be very difficult for my client to take
the position that my client has not "used
confidential information" in deciding to go
hostile.
Joel, it's not that complicated to put together a
"clean team." Your client could have both a
clean team and-I won't call it a "dirty
team"-another team; and the other team is the
one that can look at my client's confidential
data. That data would be walled off, so that
members of the clean team would not have
access to it, and only the clean team members
would be permitted to get involved in the
decision as to whether your client will go
hostile on my client. If you want to talk with
us about whether folks who are not on the
clean team can report on some high-level basis
to clean team members about their findings, we
may be able to accommodate that. But I just
don't think it's appropriate for your client to
use my client's confidential data to launch a
hostile bid for my client.
Joel, we see clean teams used frequently in due
diligence investigations. What's wrong with
Gar's proposal? Why not identify the team
that would make the decisions regarding any
hostile approach your client might want to
make, and have that team walled off from the
team that receives and reviews the target
company's confidential information?
Clean teams work just fine for certain kinds of
information, and if we were talking about
walling off technical specifications of products
or detailed customer-by-customer analyses of
costs and revenues, that would probably be
[Vol. 117:3





acceptable. But what we can't do is wall off
my client's board of directors and senior
management from being able to have in mind,
for example, the synergy estimates developed
in the context of my client's due diligence
investigation. When my client's board
members make their decision to go hostile on
the target company, they're going to know that
a year and a half ago we concluded we could
save a billion dollars a year by combining these
two businesses. You can't erase that. It's quite
relevant to deal pricing, and that kind of high-
level strategic information is very hard to wall
off because inevitably the decision makers who
need to consider it, at least in a deal this
substantial to my client, are top-level people
who can't be replicated on two separate teams.
Joel, can you walk us through your suggested
permitted use language? You did a lot more
here than just eliminate the word "negotiated."
You actually added words like "facilitating," as
in "facilitating a possible transaction." I
suspect that might tie into things like proxy
contests and other hostile tactics that aren't
necessarily "transactions" per se.
That's right, Rick. It's always important when
drafting contractual language to take into
account the experience of others, in this case
what happened with Martin Marietta in the
Vulcan litigation earlier this year. And some of
the arguments that were made there-some
successful, some ultimately not decided-
included such things as the word "between"
implying that it is an entity-to-entity
transaction and not a transaction involving a
direct approach to stockholders.' 3 Similarly,
words like "negotiating" and "implementing"
may not cover a preparatory action we need to
13. See Vulcan Materials Co., 56 A.3d at 1106.
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take, such as a proxy contest to replace the
target company's board members so that we
can get the new board to pull the target
company's poison pill. That proxy contest
facilitates an ultimate deal, but it may very
well not be a "transaction" that's part of the
ultimate deal. So, what we have tried to do
here, as Gar did in his language, is be candid
and forthright about what we're seeking to
achieve. We want to be able to do things to
pursue and facilitate a transaction even if these
things are preparatory in nature and don't
themselves constitute a "transaction."
Along the same lines, we don't want to have a
notion that the transaction has to be between
two entities. A hostile tender offer isn't a
transaction "between" the buyer and the target
company. That's why we said involving the
target company or any of its stockholders. And
then, again to avoid any doubt-because quite
honestly it's not my objective in negotiating
these things to drive business to my litigation
department-we said quite specifically that we
can proceed on an unsolicited or uninvited
basis.
Joel, the Vulcan case isn't the first case to point
out some of these key wording distinctions in
the verbiage of confidentiality agreements.
Wasn't there a previous Canadian case that
addressed these issues?
Yes, there was a Canadian case that addressed
these issues. The court in that case basically
took the use restriction and turned it into an
injunction against a hostile takeover.' 4 The
Vulcan decision has received a lot more
attention than the Canadian case for a couple of
reasons. First, because Delaware is such a key
14. See Friendly Tender Offers, supra note 6, at 642 n.45.
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forum for these types of disputes and, second,
because the Vulcan case was litigated very
thoroughly. It's hard to imagine any
arguments that weren't made by the parties in
that case. The Chancery Court's opinion is a
wonderful analysis, provision by provision, of
things people do in confidentiality agreements.
What we're seeing in the market now are
people responding to that. If the word
"between" can be argued to connote
"negotiated," which was certainly an argument
that Chancellor Strine found to be valid on the
facts of the Vulcan case,15 then, if you want to
be able to go hostile, you don't use the word
"between." You use the word "involving."
Gar, in our hypothetical negotiation, the parties
have agreed to an explicit 15-month standstill.
And as Joel pointed out, the narrow use
restriction that you put forward could operate
as a back-door standstill even after the
expiration of the negotiated 15-month period.
That's because, as a practical matter, it's very
hard for Joel's client to go hostile in month 16
without using at least some of the confidential
information that your client provided to Joel's
client in due diligence. In an actual
negotiation, would you agree to the expanded
permitted use language [in Exhibit 2] that Joel
has proposed to address this issue?
Yes, I would. If the deal is 15 months for the
term of the standstill, my client shouldn't be
looking for semi-sneaky back-door ways of
extending it.
In some senses, this is partly an emotional
issue. Saying that, I don't mean to downplay
it. But in the early phases of the negotiations,
when you are having discussions CEO-to-CEO
15. See Vulcan Materials Co.,56 A.3dat 1115.
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about a friendly deal, to have the buyer's
lawyer send over a confidentiality agreement
containing an explicit acknowledgement that
after 15 months the buyer might decide to do
this unilaterally and go hostile, that can really
trigger a negative emotional reaction on the
part of the target company's CEO. But if the
target company's counsel is thoughtful about
the issue, it's not one he will fight hard on.
One way this is resolved in the marketplace is
to simply make the time periods coterminous,
so that the use restriction and the standstill
provision run for the same period of time.
Then, I don't need to fuss about the permitted
use language because the use restriction




Now, let's take a look at the "second
commandment," which appears in section l(b)
of the confidentiality agreement. It's the
disclosure restriction. It says that the
prospective buyer may not disclose any of the
target company's confidential information,
except as permitted in section 4.
I turn the page to section 4, Gar, and there I see
that in section 4(a)(iii) you're permitting the
prospective buyer to disclose your client's
confidential information "to the extent required
by applicable law or governmental regulation
or by valid legal process." That seems fair. If
the prospective buyer is legally required to do
something, it should not be precluded by this
confidentiality agreement from doing it. But in
the very next sentence you've added some
verbiage that I haven't seen in negotiated
confidentiality agreements before Vulcan. This
sentence seems to say that, under certain
circumstances, even after the 15-month
[Vol. 117:3
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standstill period expires, the buyer may not
make use of the "required by law" exemption
in clause (iii)(A). And one circumstance under
which the prospective buyer is prohibited from
using this "required by law" exemption is
where the prospective buyer decides to make a
hostile tender offer or to accumulate target
company shares. Yet, as we've just confirmed
in the context of discussing the use restriction,
beginning in month 16 the prospective buyer
should be free to do just about anything of a
hostile or coercive nature. So please explain
what this additional sentence is intended to do
and why it's here.
Well, I admire Joel's style because, uneducated
as I may have been, I had always thought that
provisions like section 4(a)(iii) were intended
to address the prospective buyer's need to be
able to respond to a subpoena. But after
reading the lower court's decision in Vulcan, I
realize that a prospective buyer could argue
that this provision goes further than that. The
prospective buyer could argue that this
provision comes into play when the
prospective buyer unilaterally makes a
decision, after the expiration of the 15-month
standstill period, to go out and buy target
company shares. The prospective buyer could
reason as follows: "Well, of course, under the
U.S. securities laws, I must either (1) disclose
all material nonpublic information I have about
the target company before I purchase target
company shares, or (2) abstain from purchasing
those shares. And because I want to purchase
target company shares, I am 'required by
law'-by U.S. securities laws-to disclose all
material confidential information in my
possession. Section 4(a)(iii)(A) permits me to
do just that."
Now it's not at all clear to me that the
2013]









prospective buyer's argument that this
disclosure is "required by law" would stand up.
In fact, there is authority suggesting that
disclosure in this context is not "required by
law."' 16  But I'm not inclined to take any
chances, especially in light of the Vulcan
opinion, and that's why I put this sentence in
here at the end of section 4(a). I want to make
it clear that Joel's client can't decide to go
hostile and then use this "required by law"
exemption to publish my client's sensitive
information.
Joel, you've crossed out [in Exhibit 2] this
sentence at the end of section 4(a), so I assume
you want to retain the flexibility to do just
that-to make any disclosure of confidential
information legally required to enable your
client to proceed with a tender offer. In fact, in
your mark-up [in Exhibit 2], you even added
language, in parentheses at the end of clause
(a)(iii), to make it crystal clear that you can do
this.
Correct. I made it clear that my client can
disclose confidential information "as required
by law," even if the law becomes applicable
only as a result of a specific decision on the
part of my client, such as the decision to go
hostile.
Gar, you might use the term "bootstrapping" to
describe what Joel is seeking to do.
That word does, in fact, capture the notion.
What Joel is seeking to be able to do reminds
16. Chancellor Strine expressly declined to reach this issue in Vulcan Materials Co.
See id. at 1135 n.241. Vulcan had argued that Martin Marietta could not "manufacture its
own legal requirement" and then use that requirement to permit disclosure of information
that was otherwise required to be kept confidential (citing, inter alia, ARTHUR LINTON
CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 76.11; Peckham v. Indus. Sec. Co., 113 A. 99 (Del.
1921)). See Vulcan Materials Company's Post-Trial Brief at 55-56, Martin Marietta
Materials, Inc. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 56 A.3d 1072 (2012) (No. 7102-CS).
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Interestingly, this is one issue that Chancellor
Strine avoided in Vulcan. The Chancellor
declined to decide whether voluntary conduct
that triggered a disclosure requirement was
covered, because he got to his decision in a
different way. 17 But this issue goes back to
this basic business premise: there's no legal
way we can do a hostile. offer without
disclosing at least some matters that are
protected by the confidentiality agreement;
therefore, the confidentiality agreement must
permit that disclosure after the standstill period
has expired. Take an obvious example: the
prior negotiations between the parties
regarding a possible friendly acquisition of the
target company by my client. The SEC's
regulations require my client to write a
"background" section in its tender offer
document that discloses these negotiations.
Your point, Joel, is that those prior negotiations
constitute confidential information under the
confidentiality agreement, but the SEC's tender
offer regulations might require disclosure of
these negotiations if your client decides to
make a hostile tender offer in month 16.
But I think that's okay. We'll agree to that
disclosure. Disclosing past negotiations won't
be troubling to my client.
But there might be other things that fall into
that category as well. If, for example, my
17. See Vulcan Materials Co., 56 A.3dat 1113.
2013]
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client has worked out synergy numbers based
on confidential information, I don't see how
my client can go out into the market with a
tender offer without disclosing those numbers.
Are you going to be okay with that too?
Bootstrapping may seem to be a bad thing to
do, and it's certainly the prejudicial term a
good advocate would use. However, if we go
back to the basic business premise that, after
the 15-month standstill period, my client is
supposed to be able to unilaterally launch a
hostile tender offer, then my client needs to be
able to do the things that go along with that. If
we wanted to develop a more refined approach,
I would say that you can probably make some
distinction in the confidentiality agreement
between types of confidential information that,
if disclosed, would be really harmful and those
that would not. If Gar is representing the Coca
Cola Company as the target of an acquisition, I
do not want or need the right to put the secret
formula for Coke Classic in my tender offer
documents.
Right. That's not the same thing as disclosing
past acquisition negotiations. There is often an
argument made that the prospective buyer
needs to let the target company's confidential
information go stale before initiating a hostile
bid. Most targets would not like to see their
raw confidential information disclosed if it's
still market sensitive. But I agree that
disclosing past negotiations should not be
controversial. And we would think of a way to
address the synergies point. But this is what
pushes people towards the solution that Joel
articulated before, which is simultaneous
termination of the standstill provision and other
restrictions in the confidentiality agreement.
[Vol. 117:3

















Yes. And clearly, if Gar's client had disclosed
the secret Coke Classic formula somewhere in
the course of my client's due diligence
investigation, that would be excepted from the
termination of the disclosure restriction.
Right.
Joel, you wouldn't have seen language like the
language Gar included at the end of section
4(a) three years ago in an M&A-related
confidentiality agreement, would you? Isn't
this something that target companies are only
now starting to address in the wake of the
Vulcan decision?
That's right. Perhaps target companies should
have included this type of language in the past.
But, given that the "bootstrap" issue was
argued in Vulcan and Chancellor Strine
specifically declined to decide that issue,18 the
Vulcan case invites the parties to do some
private ordering here.
And that "bootstrap" issue has been lurking out
there for a while.
Have you in fact seen an increase in the
frequency with which parties have specifically
addressed this particular issue since the Vulcan
decision, Gar?
I'd say yes, certainly.
I'd say yes too. And I'd also say that a related
issue the parties are addressing a lot more
carefully now since Vulcan is what it means for
an action to be "required by law." Chancellor
18. See id.
2013]







Strine went through a detailed analysis
distinguishing between general legal
requirements, on one hand, and what he called
"external demands," like subpoenas, on the
other. 19
And the so-called notice and vetting provisions
that you often find in confidentiality
agreements-the provisions that require the
prospective buyer to give advance notice to the
target company before making certain legally
compelled disclosures of the target company's
confidential information-also did not get as
much attention as they should have before
Vulcan. It's a kind of interesting exercise to
have to go through if you're trying to go
hostile, to say that the first thing you need to do
is call the target company and say: "I'm about
to launch a hostile bid. Here's my tender offer
document, and I've circled the stuff that is
covered by the confidentiality agreement and is
required by law to be disclosed."
Right, but I think the better reading of
confidentiality agreements before Vulcan on
what we've been calling the "bootstrap" issue
was that disclosures of confidential information
in a tender offer were not "required by law"
and so were prohibited by the confidentiality
agreement.
I agree. But after reading Chancellor Strine's
opinion in Vulcan, I'm no longer convinced
that's the better reading. There's almost no
argument that's too much of a reach to make
when you have a case litigated like this.
But again, it does push you toward making the
standstill provision and the use and disclosure
restrictions coterminous, if for no other reason
19. Seeid. at 1124-36.
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than because the dialogue back and forth
between CEOs is excruciating when you say:
"Well, you know, we need to map out for you





We've been talking about how each of the
"two commandments"-the use restriction and
the disclosure restriction--can operate as a
back-door standstill. Let's turn our attention to
the express standstill provision itself. The
target company's draft of the standstill
provision appears in section 7 [in Exhibit 1].20
Again, we negotiated the standstill provision at
our session last year, and we're not going to
repeat that negotiation this year.
Lisa, let me address a question to you as the
panel's Delaware law expert. Let's assume
that the board of directors of Gar's client, the
target company, has decided to sell the target
company for cash and is seeking preliminary
bids from multiple potential bidders. Before
being allowed to conduct due diligence, each
potential bidder is asked by the target company
to sign a confidentiality agreement containing a
protective standstill provision. The target
company's board is, of course, in "Revlon"
mode 21-its duty is to run the sale process in a
manner reasonably designed to obtain the best
risk-adjusted price reasonably attainable for
stockholders. 2 Suppose an important potential
bidder refuses to agree to a standstill provision,
and the target company's board decides to
exclude that potential bidder from the due
20. See infra pp. 700-03 (Exhibit 1).
21. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del.
1986).
22. See id. at 182.
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diligence process. Is that decision defensible?
I recognize that Delaware courts are reluctant
to establish bright-line rules and that every case
is fact-specific. But as a general matter, are
Delaware judges inclined to uphold decisions
to exclude potential bidders who balk at
standstill restrictions?
As you say, it's all very case specific and
depends on the specific facts. But the answer
is, generally, yes-courts will support that sort
of decision.23
Particularly for a company that's conducting an
auction process, it's very credible to argue that
the only way to really extract the best bid from
each of your bidders is for them to understand
that there is no second round. The bidders
need to understand that, if they lose in the first
round and you sign a deal with somebody else,
they've contractually given up the right to
come back. And that to me, as a matter of
auction theory, is a very credible, value-
maximizing strategy.
Let's look a little more closely at the wording
of the standstill provision. Clauses (a) through
(g) prohibit the prospective buyer from doing
various things. For example, during the
standstill period, the prospective buyer can't
commence a hostile tender offer for shares of
the target company, can't do a public or private
"bear hug," can't accumulate target shares in
the open market, and can't make uninvited
proposals to acquire the target company. On
top of that, clause (h) specifies that the
23. See Alliance Gaming Corp. v. Bally Gaming Int'l, Inc., No. 14440, 1995 WL
523543, at *2 (Del. Ch. Aug. 11, 1995) (upholding a board's decision to decline to
provide confidential information to a bidder that refused to sign a standard confidentiality
and standstill agreement); In re J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc. S'holders Litig., 542 A.2d 770,
784 (Del. Ch. 1988) (finding that a board's insistence upon a particular form of standstill
agreement did not unfairly favor one bidder over another).
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prospective buyer can't even request or
propose that the target company amend or
waive any of the standstill restrictions.
Lisa, the Delaware Court of Chancery has
recently focused on the way that clause, which
prohibits a mere request for a waiver, interacts
with the non-solicitation and related provisions
in the definitive acquisition agreement.24 What
are the court's concerns?
This clause can become a problem if the target
company has entered into a definitive
acquisition with a buyer, and another bidder
seeks to make a "topping" bid. If that other
bidder has signed a confidentiality agreement
with the target company containing a standstill
provision that includes a clause similar to
clause (h), and if that standstill provision did
not "fall away" upon the signing of the
definitive acquisition agreement between the
target company and the original buyer 25 (and
accordingly remains in effect), then that other
bidder is contractually precluded from
communicating its interest in submitting a
topping bid to the target company. At the same
time, the definitive acquisition agreement with
the original buyer will invariably contain a
non-solicitation provision preventing the target
company from reaching out to the potential
bidder to find out about its interest in bidding,
and may also contain a provision requiring the
target company to enforce, and not waive, any
standstill restrictions binding upon parties such
as the potential bidder. These provisions can
operate collectively to prevent the potential
bidder from coming back to the table during
the standstill period. We refer to this as a
"don't-ask-don't-waive" scenario.
24. See Friendly Tender Offers, supra note 6, apps. J & K, at 725-28.
25. For a description of "fall-away" provisions, see id. at 645-47.
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At least two Delaware judges have commented
negatively on this. In Celera,26 Vice
Chancellor Parsons suggested that, while he
wasn't making a definitive statement on the
validity of "don't-ask-don't-waive" provisions,
he was concerned that they could lead to
"willful blindness" on the part of the target
company's board.27  In RehabCare,28 Vice
Chancellor Laster was more direct in his
comments. He said, "When is that ever going
to hold up if it's actually litigated, particularly
after Topps? It's just one of those things that
optically looks bad when you're reviewing the
deal facts."29
I've always wondered what would really
happen if a potential bidder who was subject to
a standstill just went out to the target's
stockholders and offered them ten dollars a
share more than the price on the table, in
flagrant violation of the standstill restrictions.
I have a tough time seeing Vice Chancellor
Laster or Chancellor Strine saying to that
potential bidder: "Oh no. You've violated
your standstill. Put that offer back in your
pocket."
Yes, the topping bidder might be inclined to
ask, "What damages has the target company or
26. In re Cetera Corp. S'holder Litig., No. 6304-VCP, 2012 WL 1020471 (Del. Ch.
Mar. 23, 2012), ajfd in part, rev'd in part, 2012 WL 6707736 (Del. Dec. 27, 2012).
27. In re Celera Corp., 2012 WL 1020471, at *21-22.
28. Transcript of Record, In re RehabCare Group, Inc. S'holders Litig., C.A. No.
6197-VCL (Del. Ch. Sept. 8, 2011).
29. Id. at 46; see also Transcript of Record at 14-15, In re Complete Genomics, Inc.
S'holder Litig., C.A. No. 7888-VCL (Del. Ch. Nov. 27, 2012) (granting preliminary
injunction and finding that "a Don't Ask, Don't Waive Standstill is impermissible
because it has the same disabling effect as the no-talk clause, although on a bidder-
specific basis"); cf Transcript of Record, In re Ancestry.com Inc. S'holder Litig., C.A.
No. 7988-CS, at 67-90, (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 2012) (requiring the board to make additional
disclosures regarding a don't-ask-don't-waive provision and noting that Delaware has no
per se rule against such provisions and that, if used properly, such provisions can be a
useful tool in obtaining a highest and best offer).
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any of its stockholders suffered as a result of
my breach of the standstill?"
That's right.
But Joel, you pointed out in our session last
year-it's in the edited transcript-that there
certainly are situations where an overt breach
of a standstill can conceivably result in
significant damages. I believe you cited the
Ventas litigation in Canada.30
That's right. Interestingly, while the standstill
litigation was in Canada, the damages action
was in the United States. 3'
It's just such an ugly argument for the original
buyer to say, "I had the right to buy this target
company at a price lower than the topping
bidder's price."
I agree that, in the specific fact pattern of a
higher bid sitting out there, it's kind of difficult
to argue that the higher price shouldn't be
offered to the target company's stockholders,
even though it may violate a standstill
agreement. On the other hand, in his Vulcan
decision, Chancellor Strine goes on at some
length about the overall corporate market
interest in encouraging companies to be willing
to engage in preliminary discussions by
protecting them against unwanted
consequences that flow from it. 32 If you follow
his lead and look at this as a systemic matter,
you have to ask: Is the target company really
going to get the bidder's best bid in the first
process?
30. See Friendly Tender Offers, supra note 6, at 648-49.
31. See id. at 649 n.48.
32. See Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 56 A.3d 1072,
1136-38 (Del. Ch. 2012), affd, 2012 WL 2783101 (Del. July 10, 2012).
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I agree. I think the standstill in a
confidentiality agreement is very much
collateral to the rules of the road that you set
out in an acquisition agreement. Clearly, the
buyer that enters into a definitive acquisition
agreement with the target company ought to
expect that a court will enforce the no-shop and
no-talk provisions in that agreement. But if I
am that buyer, I have difficulty articulating that
a standstill restriction in a confidentiality
agreement between the target company and
another bidder was really something I relied on
to preclude that other bidder from making a
topping bid.
But would you say that even if, as the original
buyer, you negotiated for a specific provision
in the definitive acquisition agreement
requiring the target not to waive, and in fact to
actively enforce, its rights under standstill
agreements with other bidders?
That sort of provision is not uncommon in
acquisition agreements, as you know.33
I think that sort of provision makes the buyer's
position stronger. But I still think it looks like
opportunism on the part of the buyer.
So, the standstill provision presents a
fascinating series of issues that are continuing
to play out, both at the negotiating table and in
the courts. Stay tuned on this; there are bound
to be additional developments.
33. See Friendly Tender Offers, supra note 6, app. J, at 726 (clause (d)).
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RICK CLIMAN:
(Moderator)
Now let's turn to section 3 of the
confidentiality agreement, which appears [in
Exhibit 1].34 It's long, so I won't read it word
for word. It's basically what we might call a
"non-reliance" provision as part of a liability
disclaimer for the benefit of the target
company. This provision has the prospective
buyer acknowledging that the prospective
buyer is not relying on any representation or
warranty as to the accuracy or completeness of
the confidential information that's being
supplied on behalf of the target company in the
due diligence context. The provision goes on
to say that the target company will have no
liability for any inaccuracies in that
information.
The actual wording of this provision varies
from agreement to agreement, but you see this
sort of provision included frequently in M&A-
related confidentiality agreements. Some
might consider it-and I hesitate to use this
word-"boilerplate."
I can understand why the target company
would want this type of provision in its
confidentiality agreements. After all, the
process of collecting and providing due
diligence information is not an exact science,
and there are bound to be errors; and, if the
parties do ultimately decide to do a deal, the
buyer will have the opportunity to negotiate
appropriate, legally binding representations and
warranties in the definitive acquisition
agreement to protect its interests.
34. See infra pp. 700-01.
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Joel, as the lawyer for the prospective buyer,
would you be willing to accept the language in
section 3?
Not necessarily. I agree with the basic premise
that due diligence is a fluid process; it's an
imprecise process, and I think as a buyer I
would find it very hard to argue for a position
that the target company has liability for
innocent mistakes it makes along the way. I do
think, though, that you can make a distinction
for fraudulent behavior, which involves
concepts of willfulness and intent to deceive.
And if you look at my mark-up of the
confidentiality agreement [in Exhibit 2],
you'll see that I've added a fraud carve-out at
the end of section 3.
Joel, do you really need that carve-out? As a
legal matter, can the contractual language that
the target company proposed in section 3
actually operate to eliminate the target
company's liability for its own outright fraud?
Aren't there law school professors who've
taught us that fraud trumps everything, and that
you can't, in a contract, avoid or release
liability for future fraud?
You might think so, in which case I would
argue that, while the carve-out I added may be
unnecessary, it's also harmless because it just
states the law. That is not the way, though, the
case law is coming out. If you take a look at
the Delaware Supreme Court's recent decision
in RAA, 36 you'll see that the court held that a
disclaimer very much like the one here was
sufficient to neutralize a fraud claim by the
prospective buyer.37
35. See infra pp. 703-06.
36. RAA Mgmt., L.L.C. v. Savage Sports Holdings, Inc., 45 A.3d 107 (Del. 2012).
37. See id at 113.
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The court basically said that sophisticated
parties are free to set the rules of the road for
how they are going to conduct the due
diligence exercise. On that basis, the court
upheld a Superior Court decision rejecting a
damage claim by a prospective buyer that
claimed it had been defrauded. The
prospective buyer had asked several times
about significant contingent liabilities of the
target company, and claimed that the target
company willfully concealed at least three such
contingent liabilities. The prospective buyer
claimed it spent substantial sums on its due
diligence investigation, which came to naught
once the buyer learned about the concealed
contingent liabilities and thereafter ceased its
efforts to buy the target company.
So, Gar, what about that? Are you going to
accept Joel's fraud carve-out? The RAA case
seems to say that the language in section 3
gives your client a license to deliberately lie in
due diligence. Would you agree that, if Joel
could prove that your client deliberately lied,
and that Joel's client spent a lot of extra money
doing due diligence in reliance on your client's
deliberate lies, Joel's client should at least be
able to recover its due diligence costs from
your client?
No. This is a classic example of what people
call "putting the bunny in the hat" because one
litigator's innocent mistake is another
litigator's fraud. The second thing I would say
in a situation like this is that the amount of
potential damages associated with a due
diligence exercise is probably going to be very
small relative to the size of the deal. And, as
much as I understand the theoretical argument
that my client might be defrauding someone
willfully, my response to Joel will be very
simple: "We understand your position. But if
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you insist on a fraud carve-out, we just won't
include your client in the auction."
The result in RAA wasn't particularly
surprising to those of us who were familiar
with the Delaware case law in this area. We
already knew about the effect of non-reliance
clauses under Delaware law-how a non-
reliance clause can actually limit a prospective
buyer's fraud remedies. Nonetheless, I think
this decision did come as a surprise to certain
practitioners and their clients. I think it served
as something of a wake-up call for buyers and,
in some cases, has changed the way they
negotiate disclaimer provisions in
confidentiality agreements. Recently, I have
seen some buyers insisting on fraud carve-outs
along the lines of what Joel has proposed here.
Let me ask you out of character, Joel: Would
you actually insist on a fraud carve-out when
representing a prospective buyer in a real deal?
I'm not sure I would....
Normally not, for two reasons. First, if I were
that concerned about being defrauded by the
target, I would be saying to my client: "These
aren't people we should be talking to, period."
But second, I think there is a very strong policy
and practice in favor of saying, look, if these
preliminary discussions don't work out, and we
don't reach a deal, let's just go home, go about
our business, and not spend the next two years
arguing about the expenses. And I would note
this could cut both ways. I would not want, as
a potential buyer, to have to defend a claim that
I misled the target by telling the target we
could finance this acquisition, when in fact we
didn't have a hope or a prayer of doing it.
Again, one party's optimistic approach to life
can turn into somebody else's fraud claim, and
I think both parties are probably better served
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by simply saying that if the deal doesn't
happen, let's just go home and do other things.
But I take it you concur that you are seeing a
few more buyers out there actually seizing on
RAA and saying: "We're not going to give the
target company a license to lie."
Absolutely. And that's an argument which has
a visceral appeal to it when articulated to a
client. It's only when you step back and
analyze its implications that you realize maybe
this isn't the place you want to go.
Right. But to be clear, Joel, if you were talking
about a non-reliance clause in the definitive
acquisition agreement itself, rather than in a
confidentiality agreement, I assume your view
might be a little different. As the buyer's
lawyer, you might actually object to including
that non-reliance clause in the definitive
agreement, right?
Yes, that might be the case because there the
buyer has in fact made a material commitment.
The buyer has agreed to buy the target
company, and, while it's nice to say the buyer
should only rely on express reps and warranties
contained in the definitive agreement, anybody
who's been through a due diligence process
knows that really isn't the buyer's true
mindset. There are things you rely on that
never get encapsulated in the reps and
warranties. And I have more sympathy for a
buyer saying in that case, "If I'm actively
defrauded, I should have a remedy."
You may recall that we negotiated this point in
our session a year ago. That negotiation is
included in the edited transcript.38
38. See Friendly Tender Offers, supra note 6, at 677-82.
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Il1. DEAL STRUCTURE: RULE 14E-5 AND THE "DUAL TRACK"
APPROACH
RICK CLIMAN: Let's turn briefly to the topic of deal structure.
(Moderator) Last year, we described two alternative ways of
structuring an acquisition of a publicly traded
company: first, by means of a one-step
merger; and second, by means of a two-step
structure involving a friendly tender offer on
the front end. 39
We noted that the two-step structure is the
structure that generally allows the deal to be
completed more quickly, and, therefore, as a
general matter (but with several exceptions), it
is the structure that tends to be favored by both
parties. Buyers like speed because it truncates
the period in which their deals are vulnerable
to jumping bids. And target companies like
speed too because it shortens the period in
which something can go wrong, such as a
material adverse change giving the buyer a
walk right. Also, even in this low interest rate
environment, target stockholders presumably
like to get their money sooner rather than later
in light of the time value of money.
We mentioned last year that the speedy two-
step structure involving a front-end tender offer
presents particular challenges for private equity
buyers and other buyers seeking to use debt
financing to finance the purchase price for their
acquisitions. 40 We also mentioned that some
private equity buyers have attempted to get the
best of both worlds by taking a so-called "dual
track" approach-by simultaneously doing a
friendly tender offer and also doing the SEC
paperwork for a one-step merger, and waiting
to see which track gets them to the finish line
39. See id. at 620-36.
40. See id. at 629-31.
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first. We pointed out the Burger King deal and
the Gymboree deal as two examples of this
dual track approach. 41  And, finally, we
mentioned that the SEC staff was expressing
some potential concerns about the dual track
approach in light of SEC Rule 14e-5.42 Joel,
maybe you can bring us up to speed on where
the SEC stands on this issue.
Sure. As indicated in footnote 36 of the edited
transcript of last year's session, about a year
ago there was a law firm client alert attributing
to the SEC Staff the view that filing
preliminary proxy material for the alternative
one-step merger track while the buyer's tender
offer was still open would be a violation of
Rule 14e-5, which is the SEC rule that
prohibits purchasing or arranging to purchase
securities outside a tender offer while the
tender offer is open.
That struck me as an odd conclusion, but I
didn't have a chance to test it until a couple of
weeks ago when I and some other members of
the M&A Committee of the ABA's Business
Law Section and I had a meeting with the Staff
of the SEC's Office of Mergers &
Acquisitions. I asked the Staff about the logic
of the position described in the client alert, and
the Chief of the Office of Mergers &
Acquisitions told us that she had been
misquoted in the client alert and that the client
alert doesn't accurately reflect the Office's
position.
The Office's position is that it would be a
violation of Rule 14e-5 to commence the proxy
solicitation-to file definitive proxy materials
41. Seeid. at 631-32.
42. See id. at 632 n.36.
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and to mail proxy soliciting materials-while
the tender offer is still open. So I left the
meeting comfortable that, if I were trying to
structure a leveraged acquisition and had a
transaction in which the target company had
enough negotiating leverage to extract a dual
track approach from the buyer, we could
probably implement it. We could file our
preliminary materials while the tender offer
was proceeding, and there was no suggestion
from the SEC Staff that they would view that
as improper.
Let's follow up on that point. Gar, are you
finding that dual track structures are still being
used? And if they're not used in every private
equity deal, why not?
I don't see them used in every private equity
deal. I think it's an unwieldy structure. My
recollection is that the Burger King structure
was driven by people who were concerned with
tax laws possibly changing on December 31.
It's a lot of extra work because you're virtually
doubling expense and effort. I don't see too
many people eager to do that, absent some
compelling rationale.
It's a lot of work, and not just for the lawyers
and others drafting the documents. Think of
the financing structure the buyer needs to put
in place. The buyer has to have financing
that's ready to be drawn down when the tender
offer closes 20 business days after launch,
assuming satisfaction of the minimum
condition, which is very high in these deals
because it needs to work into a short-form
merger.
Right. If fewer than 90 percent of the target
company's outstanding shares are tendered,
then the buyer would have to exercise its top-
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up option43 to get its ownership percentage to
90 percent-the short-form merger threshold-
so as to ensure that the back end can be
completed at substantially the same time as the
front end. But if only, say, 51 percent of the
target's outstanding shares are tendered, the
target may not have a sufficient number of
authorized but unissued shares to enable the
buyer to get to that 90 percent level. The
minimum condition percentage would have to
be set at a level high enough to ensure that, if
the minimum condition is satisfied, the target
company can issue enough shares under the
top-up option to bring the buyer's ownership
up to 90 percent.
That's right. So you might have, say, an 85
percent minimum condition in your tender
offer. And, at the same time, your debt
commitments also have to say that, if the
minimum condition isn't satisfied and the
tender offer therefore fails, the debt will still be
available two months later when the one-step
merger is ready to close. Lending sources
don't like providing those kinds of
commitments, unless they get paid adequately
for them, and they will insist on getting paid
well. So I have found that most buyers will
resist a dual track structure, unless the target
company has a fair amount of bargaining
leverage.




Let's turn now to the conditions in the
definitive acquisition agreement. In the
context of the two-step structure we're
focusing on today, these are set up as tender
offer conditions. If they're not satisfied when
43. See Friendly Tender Offers, supra note 6, at 666-69.
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the buyer's tender offer finally expires, then
the buyer can abandon the tender offer and
simply walk away.
The litany of conditions that a buyer might
demand in the definitive acquisition agreement
appears in Appendix E to the transcript of last
year's session, under the heading "Annex I.
44
Last year, we discussed two important tender
offer conditions: First, the all-important and
non-waivable minimum condition, which
provides that the buyer can't close on its tender
offer unless the number of target shares it
would own represents more than 50 percent of
the target's outstanding shares; 45 and second,
the "no material adverse effect" condition, set
forth in clause (c), which allows the buyer to
refuse to close on its tender offer if the target
company has suffered a catastrophic financial
or business setback.46 We also discussed
briefly the so-called "market out" clause-
clause (h)-and confirmed that it is generally
not appropriate to include such a condition in
friendly deals of the type we've been
discussing.47
A. "Accuracy of Representations" Condition
RICK CLIMAN: Now let's review some of the conditions we
(Moderator) didn't consider last year, beginning with the
so-called "accuracy of representations"
condition proffered by the buyer in clause (a).48
Gar, it seems to say-and I'm paraphrasing
here-that the buyer can walk away if any one
of the dozens of representations made by the
target company in the acquisition agreement
44. See id. at 714-16.
45. See id. at 659.
46. See id. at 672-76.
47. See id. at 676-77.
48. Seeid. at714.
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was inaccurate in any material respect when
made, or is inaccurate in any material respect
as brought down to the closing. It seems to
turn each of the target company's
representations into a separate condition. And
it's all the more potent because you test the
accuracy of those representations at two
different points in time-at the time the
definitive acquisition agreement was originally
signed and at the time of the scheduled closing
of the tender offer. Are you going to object to
the wording of this tender offer condition?
GAR BASON: Yes. My objections are summarized in
(Counsel for Target) Appendix F to the edited transcript of last
year's session, in the second bullet point. This
formulation of the "accuracy of
representations" condition might have been
acceptable in the late 1970s, but not today.
It's even worse than you described, Rick, for a
couple of reasons. First, as you said, even
though everything is great and the reps are
completely true at the closing, the fact that
there might have been one rep that was busted
at the signing gives the buyer a walk right.
And, not only is the applicable materiality
standard, which requires the reps to be accurate
"in all material respects," off-market to begin
with, there's also a carve-out at the end that
says all MAE ["material adverse effect"] and
other materiality qualifications contained in the
reps are to be disregarded.
So, if a dog gets sick to its stomach in the
parking lot of one of the target company's
factories, it's probably a breach of a rep given
that the materiality qualifications in the reps
are disregarded. While I have occasionally
seen people make the argument in large public
company deals that an "in all material respects"
materiality standard is appropriate, it's
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completely inappropriate to then back out
MAE and other materiality qualifications from
the reps themselves.
As my opening position, though, I would insist
on an MAE-a material adverse effect-
standard rather than an "in all material
respects" standard as the overarching
materiality standard. The MAE materiality
standard is now universally used in public
company deals.
Joel, do your buy-side forms normally include
a rep that no dogs will get sick in the parking
lot?
No.
But I assume that the target company's
environmental rep would technically be
breached if all materiality qualifications in that
rep are disregarded, and a dog throws up in the
parking lot.
That's right.
Let's look at Gar's objections one at a time.
First let's focus on the materiality standard.
Your language requires each rep to be accurate
"in all material respects." Gar's response
would require the reps to be accurate except
where the inaccuracies collectively have a
"material adverse effect" on the target
company. Are the differences between these
two materiality standards meaningful to you?
Yes, they are meaningful differences. And I
must say, Gar, I liked the 1970s. It was a great
era. Great music, great deals. But, I think you
have to look at the MAE qualifier you're
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requesting in the context of the way the
Delaware judges have interpreted the term
"material adverse effect." The Delaware Court
of Chancery has acknowledged that it has
never found a material adverse effect in any
transaction.49 So, assuming that you litigate
most of these disputes in Delaware, when you
use Gar's proposed MAE-based formulation,
you're basically eliminating the "accuracy of
representations" condition altogether.
Correct. And that is exactly what the risk
allocation should be.
I will tell you, out of character, that I don't
know how I could, with a straight face, defend
the formulation we have in here [in Appendix E
to the edited transcript of last year's session],
with both the "in all material respects"
materiality standard and the provision
disregarding MAE and other materiality
qualifications in the reps themselves. For
example, if we have negotiated a rep that
there's no pending litigation against the target
company that could reasonably be expected to
have a material adverse effect, and then some
trivial piece of litigation is brought against the
target company right before the tender offer
expires, I don't see why I should be able to
argue that the rep is inaccurate. But I would be
able to do so if the MAE qualification in that
litigation rep is disregarded.
I do think, however, I can make a respectable
argument, which I know is going against
market practice, that an "in all material
respects" materiality standard is not unfair
because we negotiated the reps to have some
role. Because there's no post-closing
49. See Hexion Specialty Chems., Inc. v. Huntsman Corp., 965 A.2d 715, 738 (Del.
Ch. 2008).
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indemnification role for the target's reps when
the target is a public company, if you adopt
Gar's MAE materiality standard-which I
think Gar would concede takes the "accuracy
of representations" condition out of the
picture-we might as well save ourselves the
trouble of even including the reps.
I think in a small number of cases you still see
the "in all material respects" standard, since
many reps will already contain MAE
qualifications baked into them. If I had to
agree to the "in all material respects" standard,
it wouldn't be the end of the world, so long as
the MAE qualifications in the reps themselves
are not disregarded. I concede that the
Delaware courts have never found an MAE.
The one instance I can think of in recent years
that might rise to the level of an MAE under
the Delaware standard is the Gulf of Mexico
oil-spill catastrophe. That sounds like it had an
MAE on BP's business. I bet even Leo Strine
would agree with that.
There's no question you can think of events
that would have a "material adverse effect" on
a target company's business.
There are not too many.
If you were buying the Tokyo Electric Power
Company-TEPCO--at the time of the
Fukushima earthquake and tsunami, I believe a
court would find that to be an MAE.
Right, but I think it would have to be
something of that magnitude. Interestingly,
Lisa, my perception is that our litigators quite
accurately predicted the result in Tyson-IBP °
50. In re IBP, Inc. S'holders Litig., 789 A.2d 14 (Del. Ch. 2001).
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because our litigators have for years said the
standard to walk from a deal is very, very high.
Absolutely.
I do think, though, that the current market
practice regarding the drafting of the "accuracy
of representations" condition is much closer to
your position than mine, Gar. MAE materiality
standards are the general rule today.
Joel, I know that the M&A Committee of the
ABA's Business Law Section studies these
things. In deals involving publicly traded
target companies, do you ever see the "in all
material respects" materiality standard used in
the "accuracy of reps" condition, even as a
general standard applied collectively to all
reps?
The Committee's most recent study of public
company deals done by strategic buyers, which
covered transactions announced in 2010-both
one-step and two-step--had a very interesting
statistic on this. One hundred percent of the
deals surveyed used the broader MAE
qualification.51
There is an important exception, however,
which has become market practice. The target
company's capitalization rep, which is, in
effect, a price rep because it tells the buyer
how many shares it's paying for, along with a
few other "fundamental" representations, tend
51. See Mergers and Acquisitions Comm. of the Section of Bus. Law of the
American Bar Ass'n, 2011 Strategic Buyer/Public Target Mergers and Acquisitions Deal
Points Study, slide 20 (2011) [hereinafter 2011 Deal Points Study]; see also Mergers and
Acquisitions Comm. of the Section of Bus. Law of the American Bar Ass'n., 2012
Strategic Buyer/Public Target Mergers and Acquisitions Deal Points Study (2012)
(surveying transactions announced in 2011, which was released after the date of this
panel presentation) [hereinafter 2012 Deal Points Study]; see also id. at slide 20 (2012)
(reporting that 96% of the transactions surveyed used an MAE qualification).
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to get treated differently than the other reps.
The materiality standard applied to these
"fundamental reps" is typically much narrower
than MAE. In fact, at least in the case of the
capitalization rep, the standard may well be
even narrower than "in all material respects."
For the cap rep, I've seen qualifying language
like "except to a de minimis extent," and I've
even seen quantitative limits.
52
Joel, what about Gar's other point, which is
that you don't really need the "accurate when
made" test as long as you have the bring-down
component-the "accurate as of the closing"
test? To reframe Gar's argument: If the target
company is a pristine company at the time it is
to be sold to the buyer, with every single one of
the target's reps 100 percent accurate at that
point in time, your client shouldn't be given a
walk right just because some of those reps
happen to have been inaccurate-even
significantly inaccurate-three or four months
earlier at the time of signing. As an intellectual
matter, doesn't Gar have the better argument?
I think there are cogent arguments for the
opposing view. The strongest opposing
argument is that a buyer has an interest in not
pursuing a broken deal, and, therefore, it
doesn't want a situation in which the target is
willing to launch when the facts aren't set up to
permit a closing. Accepting Gar's position on
what the materiality standard should be, you're
suggesting the target should freely be able to
say: "Let's go forward and start a deal, and I
haven't told you about this defect in the reps
that could have a material adverse effect
because I think I could fix it by closing." It's
not something a buyer should likely accept.
52. See 2012 Deal Points Study, supra note 51 (surveying transactions announced in
2011); see also id. at slide 22 (reporting that a materiality standard narrower than MAE
applied to the capitalization representation in 94% of the transactions surveyed).
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Joel, what does the M&A Committee's study
say about this?
According to the same study of strategic deals
announced in 2010 involving public target
companies that we mentioned earlier, about
three quarters of the deals test the accuracy of
the reps at both the signing and closing, with
the remaining quarter testing the accuracy of
the reps only at the closing.53







Let's turn to some of the other tender offer
conditions. The condition in clause (e)
54
requires the parties to obtain any needed
antitrust clearances. Is this condition
controversial, Gar? Do you see it in all deals?
In the abstract, it's not at all controversial to
have requisite antitrust approvals. But I think
we could figure out in advance-before the
acquisition agreement is signed-what they
are. So, assume in this case we need EU
approval, we need Canadian approval and we
need U.S. approval. We don't know of any
other needed approvals, and we wouldn't be
prepared to have any other approvals beyond
those three as closing conditions.
So, you would want to identify those three
specific jurisdictions in the condition. What's
wrong with just having the condition refer
generically to all material antitrust approvals?
53. See 2011 Deal Points Study, supra note 51, at slide 17 (surveying transactions
announced in 2010); see also 2012 Deal Points Study, supra note 51, at slide 17
(surveying transactions announced in 2011 and reporting that 85% of transactions
surveyed tested the accuracy of the target's representations both at signing and at
closing).
54. See Friendly Tender Offers, supra note 6, at 715.
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Because-and I have nothing
Lichtenstein-I don't want Joel's
attempt to use a Lichtensteinian
approval, which he might try to





Joel, do you always readily agree when the
target company says: "Well, here are the three
jurisdictions in which we need antitrust
approval; let's mention them specifically in the
conditions so there can be no question as to
which approvals we need and which approvals
we don't need"?
Candidly, I have a fair amount of sympathy for
that position, though I may want to draw the
line at a different place than Gar would. But
there are two reasons why I might object to
what Gar is proposing. One is that we may not
know with certainty at the time of signing
which antitrust approvals are required. If
we're unable to figure out up front that we
need an approval in Lichtenstein, it may still
become obvious that we do a week later when
the deal is public and we can investigate more
freely.
This problem is compounded because, for
better or for worse, a lot of countries have
asserted a very broad jurisdictional reach in
interpreting their premerger clearance laws,
and you may find that a country in which you
have no physical presence takes the view that
your transaction is subject to their review
simply because a trickle of products finds their
way into that country. On the other hand, as
buyer's counsel, I find it hard to argue that the
buyer should be able to abort a major
transaction for that reason because the target is
going to be worried that it won't be for that
reason. The target may believe we're using
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that particular reason as an excuse to walk
away from the deal.
So, I think in general you try to identify the
relevant jurisdictions in the condition. It's
sometimes hard to do that given confidentiality
restrictions when you're negotiating a
transaction with a large, multinational
company. But certainly if you can identify the
relevant jurisdictions, I think it's better for both
parties.





Gar, what about the condition in clause (f) 55
which refers to material third party consents-
consents required under contracts to which the
target company is a party? Are you going to
have a similar objection to that condition given
that it refers generically to third party consents,
even with the word "material" in there?
Yes. I'm going to object vigorously to the
notion of third party consents being a tender
offer condition. How difficult that argument is
for me depends on whether there are any such
consents required in connection with the
consummation of the acquisition. In many
large public company deals, there aren't any
required consents important enough to hold up
the deal.
If there is a significant consent that's needed,
that can create a very difficult dilemma for the
parties in that the target company will not want
to subject the completion of the deal to the
whim of a third party. The target company will
argue that the buyer should be prepared to take
that risk as a commercial matter. The target's
ability to prevail on that argument really
55. See Friendly Tender Offers, supra note 6, at 715.
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depends on the cost of obtaining the needed
consent from the third party. If the cost
equates to, say, $15 per share, that's an awfully
hard sell for the target company to make.
What you sometimes get pressed into, if the
third party consent is sufficiently material, is a
situation where the parties take some risk on
confidentiality and have discussions with the
third party before the definitive acquisition
agreement is signed and announced. I
represent one mid-size public company that has
a single customer that accounts for 85 percent
of its revenue. There are change of control
provisions in the company's contract with that
customer, and there is no way that I would
suggest launching or announcing a transaction
without having that customer's consent in my
pocket.
Yes. You would get that consent before you
actually announce the deal, because you don't
want to put leverage in the hands of that third
party.
As counsel for the target company, it would be
silly for me to argue in that situation that the
buyer should be required to close the deal
without the required consent in hand. But
when you're talking generally about
unidentified material consents, I think most
targets would just say absolutely not.
I'm curious Gar-and not that I've seen this
done a lot-would you be more comfortable if
the closing condition in clause (f) instead
referred generally to "any third party consent,
the absence of which would have an MAE"?
I'd fight that language, because you ought to be
able to identify any such consent in the due
diligence process.
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What about the litigation condition, Gar? It's
in clause (i); and there's a related condition in
clause 0). 56 Clause (i) basically says that the
buyer doesn't have to purchase shares tendered
in its tender offer if there's pending or
threatened litigation challenging the deal.
Does that look okay to you?
This condition is definitely not okay to the
extent the existence of private party litigation
gives the buyer a walk right. Remember, the
plaintiffs' bar sues on almost every deal.
Joel, I assume you agree that if this condition is
going to be in there at all, it should relate only
to governmental litigation.
Well, certainly I could not, with a straight face,
argue for a condition requiring the absence of
stockholder litigation. I think there are
statistics confirming that something north of 90
percent of the public M&A deals in this
country with an acquisition price of $100
million or more attract stockholder litigation.57
And while you could try to identify other kinds
of private litigation that may be less frequent, I
think in the real world you just don't see
litigation outs based on private litigation in
these deals.
The much more complicated issue is
governmental proceedings because, if the FTC
or the DOJ is starting a case against the buyer
56. See Friendly Tender Offers, supra note 6, at 715-16.
57. See ROBERT M. DAINES & OLGA KOUMRIAN, CORNERSTONE RES., RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION INVOLVING MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS:
MARCH 2012 UPDATE (2012), available at http://bit.1y/Vpu8FH.
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to challenge the contemplated acquisition, the
target company may take the view: "No, we
actually want you to go the distance and
litigate against the FTC and the DOJ." But
that's a subset of a broader argument about
what the buyer's antitrust commitment is to get
the deal done.
58
But suppose Lichtenstein threatens to bring a
suit challenging the transaction? Even if you
agreed to include this condition, Gar, you
might have to specify that pending or
threatened lawsuits by only certain specified
governmental plaintiffs will allow the buyer to
refuse to close.
Yes, I've done that in the past.
The reality is that, while most of us take the
position that private litigation is just a cost to
the buyer of doing the deal, litigating full out
with the Justice Department is a wholly
different matter which has costs and other
burdens that the buyer may not be so willing to
accept.
In a deal that's not antitrust-sensitive, Joel, are
you going to insist on this litigation condition,
limiting it just to governmental litigation? Or
would you be willing to get rid of it entirely?
I'm not going to necessarily insist on it, but I
would prefer it. It would depend on what other
litigation risks may come out from the
government. We talked about antitrust, but
there are also other areas that the government
takes a strong interest in. You have to be very
context specific here.
58. See Friendly Tender Offers, supra note 6, at 692-98.
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Isn't it true, though, Joel, that in public
company acquisitions, both one-step and two-
step, you often see no litigation condition at
all, particularly in deals that are not
antitrust-sensitive? In those deals, the buyer
wouldn't have to close if there were an actual
injunction in effect precluding the closing of
the transaction; 59 but, in the absence of an
injunction, the buyer would be required to
close in the face of any pending or threatened
litigation challenging the deal, whether private
or governmental.
You're right. According to the statistics
compiled by the M&A Committee for strategic
public company deals announced in 2010-
both one-step and two-step-50 percent did not
contain a closing condition with respect to
governmental litigation.6°




Let's turn now to the deal protection provisions
in the acquisition agreement, which we
61addressed briefly in last year's program.
These are the provisions that the buyer requests
in order to deter potential interlopers-
potential competing bidders-from making
topping bids after the definitive acquisition
agreement is signed. We know from Lisa, our
Delaware counsel who addressed this point at
last year's session, that there's a limit as to
how far the buyer can go in this regard. The
fiduciary duties of the target company's board
of directors limit the scope of permissible deal
59. See Friendly Tender Offers, supra note 6, app. E, at 715 ("Annex I" clause (h)).
60. See 2011 Deal Points Study, supra note 51, at slide 35 (surveying transactions
announced in 2010); see also 2012 Deal Points Study, supra note 51, at slide 34
(surveying transaction announced in 2011 and reporting that 42% of the transactions
surveyed did not contain a closing condition with respect to governmental litigation).
61. See Friendly Tender Offers, supra note 6, at 682-86.
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protection that a buyer can extract.
Joel, let's look at the board recommendation
covenant, pursuant to which the buyer requires
the target company's board to recommend that
the target company's stockholders tender their
shares to the buyer in response to the buyer's
tender offer. This covenant also precludes the
target board from later withdrawing its
recommendation, subject to a key exception
which we'll be addressing shortly. To set the
stage for our discussion of this covenant, Joel,
why does a buyer insist on this? How
important is it?
It's important because the buyer wants to know
that it's pursuing a supported deal. The buyer
wants to know it's going out to the target
company's stockholders with the blessing of
the target company's board, not only when it
signs the acquisition agreement but also
throughout the tender period because there are
stockholders who value the judgment and
opinion of the board as to the merits of the
transaction.
This covenant is universally subject to a
fiduciary exception. The Delaware courts have
made it pretty clear that a board can't be
contractually required to continue to
recommend a deal under all circumstances.
The fiduciary exception lays out certain
circumstances under which the board can
modify or withdraw its recommendation in
support of the deal.
We included in Appendices G, H, and I to the
edited transcript of last year's session three
different versions of that fiduciary exception.62
At the risk of oversimplifying, Appendix G
62. See id. at 721-24.
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contains the narrowest, and therefore the most
buyer-favorable, fiduciary exception. It limits
the ability of the target company's board to
withdraw its recommendation to situations
where a topping bid has been made by a
competing bidder. Under this version of the
fiduciary exception, the target board is not
permitted to withdraw its recommendation
except in the specific context of a higher bid.
No other reason will suffice to allow a change
in the recommendation, not even a sudden,
dramatic improvement in the target's operating
results that significantly increases the target's
value.
Appendix H is at the other end of the spectrum.
It contains the broadest fiduciary exception and
therefore is the most target-favorable version
of this provision. It allows the target board to
withdraw its recommendation for any reason
whatsoever, as long as the board determines
that there would be a material risk of a breach
of its fiduciary duties if it didn't withdraw the
recommendation.
Last, we have, in Appendix I, a hybrid
provision that's somewhere between the two
extremes. The fiduciary exception in
Appendix I allows the target board to withdraw
its recommendation if the board determines
that its fiduciary duties so require, but only if
there has been some sort of unforeseeable
"intervening event" that leads the board to
reconsider its recommendation.
So, Joel, we have provided three versions of
the fiduciary exception to the board
recommendation covenant here, each of which
we see from time to time in acquisition
agreements. I'm sure as a buyer you prefer the
first one, which gives the target board the least
flexibility to change its recommendation. But
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stepping out of character-taking off your
buyer's counsel hat-which of these three do
you think is actually the most appropriate?
As an intellectual matter, I believe that the
most appropriate version is Appendix H, the
broadest one, because ultimately I don't think
you can put the target board in a position where
it has to lie. If it genuinely believes, for any
reason, that the deal is no longer advisable and
it can't continue to recommend it, I find a
contract that says that it is required to keep
recommending it to be a very odd concept.
I would agree with Joel. And even a contract
that requires you to stay silent for a four-day
period, or some other waiting period before
being honest with your stockholders, is
problematic.63
I'm not sure I would go that far, Lisa. If
nothing irrevocable is going to happen during
that period, I don't know that it is improper for
a buyer to say to a target company: "Look, if
you're going to change your recommendation
you're going to tell us first and tell us why, so
that we have the chance to propose
modifications to our transaction which may put
you back on target. ' 64
Right. And, at least in some agreements, that
sort of provision may help make the buyer's
63. See In re Compellent Technologies, Inc. S'holder Litig., CA No. 6084-VCL,
2011 WL 6382523, at *13 (Del. Ch., Dec. 9, 2011) (noting that a four-day
recommendation provision was "aggressive" and "raised a host of questions"). But see
Micromet, Inc. S'holders Litig., CA No. 7194-VCP, 2012 WL 681785, at * 9 (Del. Ch.
Feb. 29, 2012).
64. See Micromet, Inc. S'holders Litig., CA No. 7197-VCP, 2012 WL 681785, at *9
(Del. Ch. Feb. 29, 2012) (distinguishing Compellent and permitting a recommendation
provision that "require[d] the Board to wait until [the buyer] ha[d] been given the
opportunity to respond to a [s]uperior [olffer before undertaking to determine whether its
fiduciary obligations require the Board to change its recommendation" because the
provision "d[id] not restrict the Board's ability to fulfill known fiduciary duties in a
timely fashion").
[Vol. 117:3
NEGOTIATING ACQUISITIONS OF PUBLIC COMPANIES
match right effective. It can give the original
buyer time to come back and put together a
new bid that matches or exceeds a topping bid
made by an interloper.
Joel, both you and Lisa are pretty clear on what
you think Delaware law requires, which is a
very broad fiduciary exception to the
recommendation covenant along the lines of
Appendix H to the edited transcript of last
year's session. You believe that, if the board
changes its view on whether it should continue
to support the current deal for any reason, it
should have the absolute right to change its
recommendation and say "we no longer
support this deal." Yet, as you know, in a fair
number of deals, buyers' lawyers at fine law
firms continue to insist on narrower fiduciary
exceptions, along the lines of Appendix G or
Appendix 1. Why is that?
JOEL GREENBERG: While we believe this is the right analysis and
(Counsel for Buyer) certainly members of the Delaware judiciary
have stated publicly that this is the right
analysis, the Delaware courts haven't
addressed this head on in a decided case yet.
Chancellor Strine has certainly been observed
at the annual Coronado Securities Regulation
Institute in California saying that any kind of
restriction is nonsense and inconsistent with
the board's duties, 65 but he hasn't had
65. See Vice Chancellor Leo E. Strine, Jr., 33rd Annual Securities Regulation
Institute sponsored by Northwestern University School of Law (Jan. 18, 2006) (reported
in THE M&A LAWYER, Feb. 2008). Chancellor Strine stated:
If you're going to put out a proxy statement containing a board
recommendation 45 days before the vote, and there's a contract that says the
board must recommend the deal unless there's a higher bid, and the board
really doesn't like the deal and the reason it doesn't like the deal is because
something positive happened to the target's business or 'you've been . ..
looking for some food and up from the ground came a bubblin' crude'... if the
board nonetheless recommends the deal, I think it's violated its fiduciary
duties.... I'd also say that if you are giving advice that puts the board in that
predicament, I think it's kind of dumb advice.... And for those of you who
say that you can disclose all the other material facts that suggest why your
20131
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RICK CLIMAN:
(Moderator)
occasion, to my knowledge, to say that from
the bench. So, some buyers will take the view:
"Look, if we can get a provision into the
acquisition agreement that causes the target
company's board to pause and worry a little
bit, and it's not a provision that is per se
invalid under existing case law, why shouldn't
we?" In the most recent M&A Committee
study, nearly half the transactions had either
the superior offer or the intervening event
formulation (or both).66
We're out of time. Thanks for your attention.
recommendation is false and then supposedly recommend in favor of the deal,
you might remember that a lot of stockholders actually trust you .... This
whole thing is better dealt with in the termination fee context, rather than in
promising to tell a lie.
66. See 2011 Deal Points Study, supra note 51, at slide 55; see also 2012 Deal
Points Study, supra note 51, at slide 54 (reporting that 44% of the transactions surveyed
had either the superior offer or the intervening event formulation, or both).
[Vol. 117:3
2013] NEGOTIATING ACQUISITIONS OF PUBLIC COMPANIES 699
Exhibits
Excerpts from Target Company's Form of Confidentiality
A greem ent ....................................................................... 700
Excerpts from Prospective Buyer's Response to Target Company's
Form of Confidentiality Agreement ......................................... 704
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
EXHIBIT 1
EXCERPTS FROM TARGET COMPANY'S
FORM OF CONFIDENTIALITY A GREEMENT
DRAFT
CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT
THIS CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT ("Agreement") is
being entered into as of ., 20_, between - (the
"Prospective Buyer") and (the "Target Company"). The
Prospective Buyer and the Target Company are sometimes referred to
collectively as the "Parties."
The Parties, intending to be legally bound, acknowledge and agree
as follows:
1. Limitations on Use and Disclosure of Confidential
Information. Neither the Prospective Buyer nor any of the Prospective
Buyer's Representatives (as defined in section 13 below) will, at any
time, directly or indirectly:
(a) make use of any Confidential Information (as defined in
section 12 below), except for the specific purpose of considering,
evaluating and negotiating a possible negotiated transaction between the
Parties; or
(b) disclose any Confidential Information to any other
Person (as defined in section 13 below), except as expressly permitted in
section 4 below.
3. No Representations by the Target Company. Neither the
Target Company nor any of the Target Company's Representatives will
be under any obligation to make any particular Confidential Information
available to the Prospective Buyer or any of the Prospective Buyer's
Representatives or to supplement or update any Confidential Information
previously furnished. Neither the Target Company nor any of its
Representatives has made or is making, and neither the Prospective
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Buyer nor any of its Representatives has relied or is relying on, any
representation or warranty, express or implied, as to the accuracy or
completeness of any Confidential Information, and neither the Target
Company nor any of its Representatives will have any liability to the
Prospective Buyer or to any of the Prospective Buyer's Representatives
relating to or resulting from the use of any Confidential Information or
any inaccuracies or errors therein or omissions therefrom. Only those
representations and warranties (if any) that are included in any final
definitive written agreement that provides for the consummation of a
negotiated transaction between the Parties and is validly executed on
behalf of the Parties (a "Definitive Agreement") will have legal effect.
4. Permitted Disclosures.
(a) Notwithstanding the limitations set forth in section 1 above:
(i) the Prospective Buyer may disclose Confidential
Information if and to the extent that the Target Company
consents in writing to the Prospective Buyer's disclosure thereof;
(ii) the Prospective Buyer may disclose Confidential
Information to any Representative of the Prospective Buyer, but
only to the extent such Representative (A) needs to know such
Confidential Information for the purpose of helping the
Prospective Buyer evaluate or negotiate a possible negotiated
transaction between the Parties, and (B) has been provided with
a copy of this Agreement and has agreed to abide and be bound
by the provisions hereof; and
(iii) subject to section 4(b) below, the Prospective Buyer
may disclose Confidential Information to the extent required (A)
by applicable law or governmental regulation or (B) by valid
legal process.
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Agreement,
the Prospective Buyer shall not be permitted to disclose Confidential
Information pursuant to section 4(a)(iii)(A) if the law or governmental
regulation requiring disclosure of such Confidential Information
becomes applicable as a direct or indirect result of (i) a decision on the
part of the Prospective Buyer or any of its Representatives to commence
a tender or exchange offer for shares of the Target Company or (ii) a
decision on the part of Prospective Buyer or any of its Representatives to
2013]
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acquire beneficial ownership of any equity securities of the Target
Company.
(b) If the Prospective Buyer or any of the Prospective Buyer's
Representatives is required by law or governmental regulation or by
subpoena or other valid legal process to disclose any Confidential
Information to any Person, then the Prospective Buyer will immediately
provide the Target Company with written notice of the applicable law,
regulation or process so that the Target Company may seek a protective
order or other appropriate remedy. The Prospective Buyer and its
Representatives will cooperate fully with the Target Company and the
Target Company's Representatives in any attempt by the Target
Company to obtain any such protective order or other remedy. If the
Target Company elects not to seek, or is unsuccessful in obtaining, any
such protective order or other remedy in connection with any
requirement that the Prospective Buyer disclose Confidential
Information, and if the Prospective Buyer furnishes the Target Company
with a written opinion of reputable legal counsel acceptable to the Target
Company confirming that the disclosure of such Confidential
Information is legally required, then the Prospective Buyer may disclose
such Confidential Information to the extent legally required; provided,
however, that the Prospective Buyer and its Representatives will use their
reasonable efforts to ensure that such Confidential Information is treated
confidentially by each Person to whom it is disclosed.
7. Standstill Provision. During the two-year period commencing
on the date of this Agreement (the "Standstill Period"), neither
Prospective Buyer nor any of Prospective Buyer's Representatives will,
in any manner, directly or indirectly:
(a) make, effect, initiate, cause or participate in (i) any
acquisition of beneficial ownership of any securities of the Target
Company or any securities of any subsidiary or other affiliate of the
Target Company, (ii) any acquisition of any assets of the Target
Company or any assets of any subsidiary or other affiliate of the
Target Company, (iii) any tender offer, exchange offer, merger,
business combination, recapitalization, restructuring, liquidation,
dissolution or extraordinary transaction involving the Target
Company or any subsidiary or other affiliate of the Target
Company, or involving any securities or assets of the Target
Company or any securities or assets of any subsidiary or other
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affiliate of the Target Company, or (iv) any "solicitation" of
"proxies" (as those terms are used in the proxy rules of the
Securities and Exchange Commission) or consents with respect to
any securities of the Target Company;
(b) form, join or participate in a "group" (as defined in the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the rules promulgated
thereunder) with respect to the beneficial ownership of any
securities of the Target Company;
(c) act, alone or in concert with others, to seek to control or
influence the management, board of directors or policies of the
Target Company;
(d) take any action that might require the Target Company to
make a public announcement regarding any of the types of matters
set forth in clause "(a)" of this sentence;
(e) agree or offer to take, or encourage or propose (publicly or
otherwise) the taking of, any action referred to in clause "(a)",
"(b)", "(c)" or "(d)" of this sentence;
(f) assist, induce or encourage any other Person to take any action
of the type referred to in clause "(a)", "(b)", "(c)", "(d)" or "(e)" of
this sentence;
(g) enter into any discussions, negotiations, arrangement or
agreement with any other Person relating to any of the foregoing; or
(h) request or propose that the Target Company or any of the
Target Company's Representatives amend, waive or consider the
amendment or waiver of any provision set forth in this section 7.
The expiration of the Standstill Period will not terminate or otherwise
affect any of the other provisions of this Agreement.
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EXHIBIT 2
EXCERPTS FROM PROSPECTIVE BUYER'S
RESPONSE TO TARGET COMPANY'S
FORM OF CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT
DRAFT
CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT
THIS CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT ("Agreement") is
being entered into as of ,20-, between - (the
"Prospective Buyer") and (the "Target Company"). The
Prospective Buyer and the Target Company are sometimes referred to
collectively as the "Parties."
The Parties, intending to be legally bound, acknowledge and agree
as follows:
1. Limitations on Use and Disclosure of Confidential
Information. Neither the Prospective Buyer nor any of the Prospective
Buyer's Representatives (as defined in section 13 below) will, at any
time, directly or indirectly:
(a) make use of any Confidential Information (as defined in
section 12 below), except for the sp.ifi. p..pee of ensidering,
evaluating and negotiating a possible negotiated transaeto
betweeni the Parties except for the purpose of considering, pursuing
and/or facilitating a possible transaction involving the Target
Company or any of its stockholders, including an unsolicited or
uninvited acquisition of the Target Company or any of its securities;
or
(b) disclose any Confidential Information to any other Person
(as defined in section 13 below), except as expressly permitted in
section 4 below.
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3. No Representations by the Target Company. Neither the
Target Company nor any of the Target Company's Representatives will
be under any obligation to make any particular Confidential Information
available to the Prospective Buyer or any of the Prospective Buyer's
Representatives or to supplement or update any Confidential Information
previously furnished. Neither the Target Company nor any of its
Representatives has made or is making, and neither the Prospective
Buyer nor any of its Representatives has relied or is relying on, any
representation or warranty, express or implied, as to the accuracy or
completeness of any Confidential Information, and neither the Target
Company nor any of its Representatives will have any liability to the
Prospective Buyer or to any of the Prospective Buyer's Representatives
relating to or resulting from the use of any Confidential Information or
any inaccuracies or errors therein or omissions therefrom. Only those
representations and warranties (if any) that are included in any final
definitive written agreement that provides for the consummation of a
negotiated transaction between the Parties and is validly executed on
behalf of the Parties (a "Definitive Agreement") will have legal effect.
Notwithstanding anything to contrary contained in this section 3 or
elsewhere in this Agreement, nothing in this Agreement or in any
Definitive Agreement shall operate to limit any remedy the Prospective
Buyer may have against any Person for fraud committed by the Target
Company or any of the Target Company's Representatives (whether or
not such fraud relates to a representation made in a written agreement
between the Parties).
4. Permitted Disclosures.
(a) Notwithstanding the limitations set forth in section 1 above:
(i) the Prospective Buyer may disclose Confidential
Information if and to the extent that the Target Company
consents in writing to the Prospective Buyer's disclosure
thereof,
(ii) the Prospective Buyer may disclose Confidential
Information to any Representative of the Prospective Buyer,
but only to the extent such Representative (A) needs to know
such Confidential Information for the purpose of helping the
Prospective Buyer evaluate or negotiate a possible negotiated
transaction between the Parties, and (B) has been provided
with a copy of this Agreement and has agreed to abide and be
bound by the provisions hereof, and
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(iii) subject to section 4(b) below, the Prospective Buyer
may disclose Confidential Information to the extent required
(A) by applicable law or governmental regulation or (B) by
valid legal process (whether or not such law, governmental
regulation or legal process becomes applicable as a result of a
decision or action on the part of the Prospective Buyer).
Notwithstanding anythinig to the contai' contained in this Agreement,
the Prospeetive Buyer shall not be pefmitted to disclose Confidential
Infomation pursuant to :;eetion 4(a)(iii)(A) if the law or govrnimental
reglation requir-ng disclosure of such Confidential IH&Foafion
becomes applicable as a direct or- indirect resuilt of (i) a decision on the
part of the Prspectivc Buyer er any of its Representatives to commene
a tender rf exchange offer fo share- of the Target Compay or (ii) a
decision on the pat of Prspective Buyer or any of iits Representatives to
acquire benieficial ewnership of any equity seetir-ties of the Target
